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SYMPOSIUM 
 
THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF BANK MERGERS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Carl Felsenfeld1
The subject matter of this Conference—Banking and the Antitrust 
Laws—has received insufficient attention in the legal literature.  This is 
in curious contrast to the quantity of federal statutes that treat the 
subject: principally, we have the standard antitrust laws led by the 
Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts; the Bank Merger Act of 1960; and 
section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.  These establish 
similar, but not identical, antitrust standards for the bank transactions to 
which they apply. 
Furthermore, there has been no shortage of bank mergers and 
acquisitions since September 29, 1994, the date on which the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-
Neal”) was enacted.  I highlight that event because it marked a definitive 
change in American bank philosophy from the attitude that existed 
before Riegle-Neal—the best banks are the small banks—to the post-
Riegle-Neal dominant position that big banks are all right, too.  As the 
date of Riegle-Neal indicates, the preference for small banks existed for 
some two hundred years of our history, going back to the agrarian views 
of Thomas Jefferson whose gift with words did not extend to economics. 
Before September 1994, national banks were absolutely prohibited 
from branching interstate, thereby ensuring their small size.  State banks 
could branch interstate, but only if their home and host states consented.  
Banks could spread by the acquisition of other banks through a holding 
company system, but this was awkward and required the specific 
statutory approval of the host states.  Admittedly, by 1994 a not 
inconsequential interstate bank holding company system had developed, 
although growth had been gradual since 1954 and largely contrary to 
public sentiment. 
 1. Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Director of the Financial 
Services Institute. 
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The major contribution of Riegle-Neal was that it allowed banks—
national and state—to merge on an interstate basis without restriction, 
except for the antitrust laws already in force and for some lesser 
qualifications not relevant here.  Large bank mergers became the order 
of the day.  The mammoth bank agglomerations spanning many states 
rapidly came into existence. 
Each bank merger had to satisfy the antitrust laws.  The regulatory 
approvals that were required before a merger could go forward regularly 
referred to those laws and their effects upon the various transactions at 
issue.  In measuring banks against the relevant antitrust laws, the test 
laid down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia 
National Bank et al.2 controlled.  The case, while deciding that section 7 
of the Clayton Act applied to banking, held that the relevant geographic 
area which defined a bank market was local in nature.  The market that 
was tested to establish whether a bank merger violated the Clayton Act 
was four counties in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. 
The holding of Philadelphia National Bank applies today.  The 
number three bank in the country can merge with the number five bank.  
The resulting bank can cover twenty-five states and involve billions of 
dollars.  Whether the merger violates the antitrust laws, however, is a 
question that can ultimately turn on the situation in a half-dozen counties 
in suburban Wichita (or whatever).  There is something wrong with this 
standard. 
No bank merger since 1994 has been derailed by an antitrust 
standard.  Occasionally, local branches will overlap in an undesirable 
manner.  The solution is to sell off a few bank branches and, thereby, 
resolve the problem.  The antitrust laws are a bug to be brushed off, not 
a fundamental protection to our economic liberties. 
One sees the process continuing.  Entities like Citibank and 
JPMorgan Chase are gradually becoming the rule.  How far we will go 
in the reduction of bank numbers and the growth in bank size is 
anybody’s guess.  Also unknown is the effect that this trend will have 
upon bank services including credit cards, real estate mortgages, and 
business financings. 
This Conference brings together some of the leading thinkers in 
banking and antitrust law and policy.  We at Fordham hope that the 
attention this generates will spark some new thinking.  Perhaps there is 
 2. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
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no problem and current law is good.  That is, however, difficult to 
believe. 
ADDENDUM 
This Introduction is being written as Treasury Secretary Paulson is 
presenting a grand new design for the bank regulatory system.3  I have 
not seen reference in any of the preliminary materials to an antitrust 
issue.  It is fair to say that months will go by before the legislation 
required to effect a change of this magnitude will be enacted.  It would 
be unfortunate to lose this opportunity for constructive thinking. 
 3. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR 
A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf. 
